Aligning Policy Goals with Policy Outcomes

This recent story in the Financial Post caught my eye, suggesting Industry Canada rejected a proposed spectrum licence transfer (sale) from WIND Mobile to SaskTel prior to the recent AWS3 auction. The decision seems in keeping with 2013’s Framework Relating to Transfers, Divisions and Subordinate Licensing of Spectrum Licences for Commercial Mobile Spectrum, which was (in part) meant to increase competition by preventing spectrum concentration in market leaders. The question is will Industry Canada’s decision actually increase competition?

First, some context. WIND Mobile won the licences in question during 2008’s AWS spectrum auction. They currently operate their cellular networks in BC, Alberta, and Ontario but have not deployed in Saskatchewan — nor built networks in Manitoba, Northern Quebec, Atlantic Canada, the Yukon, North West Territories or Nunavut, also areas they won licences. These areas are all smaller markets and it seems likely that WIND will focus on their current operating markets for the foreseeable future, looking to deploy LTE networks in the areas where they secured AWS3 licences.

WIND’s AWS licences were won as part of a new entrant set-aside. According to the Policy Framework for the Auction for Spectrum Licences for Advanced Wireless Services and other Spectrum in the 2 GHz Range, “licences obtained through the set-aside may not be transferred to companies that do not meet the criteria of a new entrant for a period of 5 years from the date of issuance.” This moratorium on set-aside spectrum has lapsed though — the AWS auction occurred 6.5 years ago. What’s more, SaskTel counted as a “new entrant” in the AWS policy framework.

To be eligible for the set-aside, a new entrant is defined as:
An entity, including affiliates and associated entities, which holds less than 10 percent of the national wireless market based on revenue. 

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