Winner’s Curse: A phenomenon that may occur in common value auctions, where the winner will tend to overpay due to incomplete information.
I was planning on writing a short blurb about Rogers and winner’s curse/buyer’s remorse when Industry Canada initially announced the AWS-3 auction. I got into a Twitter conversation about AWS-3, with the thinking that the high cost of Rogers’ 700MHz spectrum would cause them to be uncompetitive against a TELUS-Bell effort to gain the non-set aside block. JF noted that Rogers would still be bidding to drive up their competitors’ costs. It’s a strategic move I agree will be likely, but felt just further reinforced my original observation.
Rogers wouldn’t hesitate to add to their industry-leading spectrum holdings, if it could be acquired at a good price. But with the significant capital outlay for their 700MHz spectrum — some might say, overpaying — Rogers would need to be extra wary of the risks of inflating auction prices beyond what value could be reasonably extracted, not wanting to ‘accidentally’ win over-priced spectrum. Europe’s experience with the winner’s curse surrounding 3G licence costs is a major contributing factor to lagging in LTE investment, something that wireless executives haven’t addressed at all during the recent CRTC wireless wholesale roaming proceedings.
I also noted that this situation would, in fact, be the worst of both worlds. Rogers would be increasing TELUS’ or Bell’s (and, thus, consumer) costs, while likely still not maximizing government revenues.